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On 17 September 2019, Matteo Renzi, the former Prime minister and former leader
of the Democratic Party (PD), has announced that he was quitting the party in order
to establish a new one, with 26 deputies and 15 senators following him. The party
has been christened Italia Viva (Lively Italy or Lebendig Italien), a name meant to
imply an optimistic and voluntaristic approach to the future: economic growth rather
than re-distribution, investments on education, family and innovation are supposed
to be at the core of its program which should be presented, discussed and fine-tuned
on 18 and 19 October in Florence when Renzi will gather his tenth Leopolda Meeting
(from the name of the oldest railway station built in the Tuscan capital at the time
when it still was under the rule of Grand Duke Leopold II of the House of Lorraine:
the old compound has become a no-frills fair ground, and here the former Mayor of
Florence has gathered his supporters every year since 2010). Symbolic attention
to gender issues will be granted by nominating a woman and a man for each party
leadership role. The move may certify both the end of the PD as it was meant to be
as well as the end of a party system cycle started over 25 year ago.
A struggle for stability
Italy has been struggling with governance issues for decades. After WWII it has
been known for the short duration of its cabinets (less than a year in average from
1948 through 1994; around 19 months thereafter), although until the electoral
reform of 1993 every single cabinet had been supported by coalitions dominated
by the Christian Democratic party and the Communist party, the largest in the West
and considered unsuited to govern by all other parties, as a powerful opposition.
Prompted by a series of popular initiatives as a reaction to ineffective governance
and corruption as well by the end of the Cold War in Europe, a strategy was
pursued to transform the Italian parliamentary system based on strictly proportional
electoral laws into a system which would still be parliamentary but somehow
resembling Westminster based on a new mostly majority voting system (Laws 276
and 277/1993). 
Three elections were held according to those laws, in 1994, 1996 and 2001. This
new arrangement had been successful, but in 2005 the center-right cabinet led by
Silvio Berlusconi changed the electoral law for strictly partisan reasons. The new
law (law 270/2005) was an original combination of proportional and majority rules:
parliamentary seats were allotted proportionally but the party or the coalition of
parties with more votes (even a single one) would get a majority in the Chamber.
For the Senate seats were allotted along the same rules but on a regional basis.
This folly made it very likely to have opposing political outcomes of the elections in
the two Chambers (which happened in 2006 and in 2013). The issue of governance
was so widely acknowledged that president Giorgio Napolitano upon his re-election
in 2013 passionately called on Parliament to pass the needed constitutional and
- 1 -
electoral reforms. In 2014, the newly nominated prime minister Matteo Renzi
committed his cabinet to comply after striking a deal with the opposition still led by
Berlusconi. The idea was to streamline Italy’s political institutions and also pass an
electoral law which would allow parliamentary elections to have a decisive outcome
(most of the times). The so-called Italian transition was expected to come to an end
after over 20 years (1993-2016).
What was not taken into account was that in the meantime a new anti-establishment
party had entered the scene. The Five Star Movement (M5S) obtained sufficient
votes to wedge itself into the party system transforming it from bipolar into tripolar.
This major change and some tactical mistakes made by Renzi (primarily his unability
to keep Berlusconi’s support for the reforms) led to the rejection of both the electoral
and the constitutional reform, putting an end to the shift towards a majoritarian
democracy and revamping proportional representation, parties fragmentation
and coalitions’ based governance. Some decisions by the Constitutional Court
significantly contributed to that outcome (dec. 1/2014 and dec. 35/2017). As a
result Parliament passed the fourth electoral law in 23 years (law 165/2017) which
resembles the 1993 laws, but 2/3 of the seats are strictly proportional (with a 3%
threshold). Since 2018, cabinets have been formed in disregard of the outcome of
the elections, solely based on after-vote party negotiations. 
The dawn of the Democratic Party
The Democratic Party has been established in 2007 by a coalition of former Christian
Democrats, former communists, former socialists, former republicans plus a
significant number of uncommitted but engaged voters. Its political and institutional
strategy was to create a party which would go beyond the old parties, which would
be progressive but without ideological allegiances to the past (therefore democratic
without further adjectives). The PD painted itself as a party with the ambition to
lead the country on the base of its platform, avoiding the painstaking and mostly
ineffective multiparty coalitions. The way to accomplish that would be constitutional
and electoral changes which would consolidate a bipolar political system. 
This project never entirely worked out: although supported by voters, it was never
accepted by large part of middle ranks of the party officials still primarily divided
between the former catholics and former communists. The first leader of the PD,
Walter Veltroni, had soon to resign; followed by a former communist, Pier Luigi
Bersani, who watered down the initial project. The 2013 elections proved ruinous
for his leadership: he conquered the majority of seats in the Chamber but not in the
Senate and was unable to form a cabinet. He resigned, and the mayor of Florence of
the time, Matteo Renzi, won by a landslide the election to lead the PD. 
His was a reformist platform with the mildly populist aim to get rid of the entire old
party ruling class. Consequently he became Prime Minister in February 2014: in
spite of the achievements of his cabinet Mr Renzi was never able to obtain the full
allegiance of a significant part of his own party’s deputies and senators. A significant
number of MPs opposed some of his flagship policies as well as the electoral and
constitutional reforms. Later some of the leftist members of the party abandoned it
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to form a small splinter party called Free and Equal (Leu). The internal opposition
contributed greatly to Renzi’s defeat in the referendum on the constitutional reform
which Parliament had passed. 
This outcome meant the rejection of the 25 years old strategy to change Italy’s
political institutions and paved the way to a return to a system similar to the one
which the country had seen from 1948 to 1993. Renzi was able to be reelected as
leader once again, but he never got full control of the party and had to resign after
the defeat in the 2018 elections. His successor Nicola Zingaretti was supported by
a coalition of middle-ranking party officials averse to reforms and oriented towards
more traditional socialdemocratic policies. Later Zingaretti appointed some of the
staunchest opponents of Renzi’s major policies as heads of the departments of
constitutional reforms and of labor. These developments might well be the end of
any ambition of the PD to be more than just another decaying socialdemocratic
party. In fact, it has been announced that the party will drop primaries as a way to
select its leader.
Political consequences
According to the Standing Orders of the Chamber, any group of at least 20 members
can form a new parliamentary group at any time. In the Senate the rules are more
strict because only a party which has been present at the previous elections may
form a group. Renzi’s Italia Viva will have at least 25 deputies, and a deal with the
leader of a tiny socialist party allows it to form an autonomous group in the Senate
as well (Psi-Italia Viva). According to the Standing Orders each group is entitled
a presence in each of the fourteen permanent committees. Since the groups are
represented proportionally.In the Italian Parliament this means a limited but not
insignificant disproportion in favor of the small groups. Furthermore the two whips
of Italia Viva and Psi-ItaliaViva will be also members of the Whips Conferences
which assist the Chairs and basically run the agenda (which unlike in many other
Parliaments is not directly controlled by the Cabinet). Italia Viva will also have a
share of the financial and logistical resources which are allotted to  Parliamentary
groups as well as its share in the political television programmes under law 28/2000.
 
Renzi has been the one who prompted PD to make a totally unexpected alliance
with the M5S with sole purpose to keep the far-right populist party Lega, conceived
as dangerous for democracy and the role of Italy in the European Union, away from
government. Coherently Renzi is committed to keep supporting the Conte II cabinet
for the entire legislative term (in theory until 2023). For the first time a cabinet sees
one of its main supporting parties splitting without loosing its parliamentary support.
To the contrary, Italia Viva has already enlisted a senator quitting Berlusconi’s
parliamentary group: if others follow, this might even increase the goverment’s
majority. It is also true, however, that Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte (as well as
M5S, Pd and Leu) will have to deal with a new partner who will be keen to gain
visibility. 
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This could make things more difficult at least on minor but popular issues.
Furthermore, Italia Viva will certainly push for policies not in line with the leftist
twist of the M5S-Pd programme. It should not be impossible to accomodate this
unexpected change but it is evident that it will take more patience and determination,
while the occasions for internal conflict will increase. Two Ministers and one
Undersecretary quit PD and joined Italia Viva whose leader within the cabinet will be
Teresa Bellanova, the popular Minister of Agriculture, a former trade unions leader
and a staunch reformist. Last but not least, there are now three autonomous political
entities with the power to trigger a cabinet crisis: unless Conte proves capable to
attract at least a dozen new senators from the opposition, Italia Viva, just like M5S
and PD, will be able to force him to resign and could use it to extort political favors
from him.
Consequences on the party system
The most significant short-term effect of the birth of Italia Viva is that it weakens the
PD. The party loses about one fourth of its presence in each chamber (from 111 to
85 in the Chamber and from 50 to 37 in the Senate). In perspective most parties
aside from Salvini’s League and its close ally Fratelli d’Italia may pay some price
to the presence of a new party placed slightly to the left of the center: primarily,
again the PD where the minority even after the split is formed by personalities who
have been close associates of Mr Renzi, mostly sharing his policies and able to
inflict a fatal blow to the party in case Zingaretti intends to close a more strict and
strategic alliance with the M5S. But also Berlusconi’s Forza Italia will be affected.
Among its 99 members in the Chamber and 61 in the Senate there are many MPs
who dislike the alliance between their ageing leader and an the ever more radical
Lega leader Matteo Salvini. Finally, even the M5S whose parliamentary personnel
would according to the polls lose badly in case of early elections, may lose a few
members to the new party. In the long term, Renzi’s Italia Viva might play a crucial
role in any coalition conceived as alternative to the populist right, taking advantage of
the difficulty of both PD and M5S to come to terms with each other. And it should be
stressed: with whichever electoral system will be then be in force.
Until a decade ago or even less, Italian politics appeared a matter of its own political
idiosyncrasies and was dismissed as a peculiar case which is cause more for an
amused smile but serious political analysis. This is not the case anymore. The sad
truth is that parliamentary regimes based on a functioning majority in Parliament
do not seem to be able to deliver sufficiently stable and effective governments
these days. Everywhere more and more fragmented societies are reflected by more
and more fragmented party systems; under the influence of social media the art of
striking compromises among diverse interests and strategies has become more and
more difficult if not impossible exercise. In other words: the task to reconcile diversity
producing a relatively unitary political project based on shared solutions has become
a nightmare. Examples abound: Belgium holds the record for lengthy negotiations
to form a majority after each election, Spain is recurring to elections every two years
or less, Israel is split like an apple, the UK after Brexit has become a worrisome
joke; even in Germany one wonders what comes next. The only exception  seem
to be France, for the time being, because of it peculiar institutional arrangements.
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In this context it is no surprise that at the European Union level the experiment of
the Spitzenkandidaten has been forcibly set aside. In a world where very different
and authoritarian systems of governance seem to provide much more nimble
governance, this is a vital issue which should be tackled: how to combine European
values and minimally effective political leadership.
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